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Abstract:  
Using two cross-sections of a representative dataset of British establishments, the effect of various forms 
of performance-related pay (objective/subjective, individual/group/collective) on the absence rates and 
productivity of firms is investigated.  Incentives that are tied to the subjective evaluation of individual 
merit are found to be significantly related to lower absenteeism, but have no effect on labour 
productivity.  In contrast, PRP that is objectively conditioned on outputs has a beneficial effect on 
workers‟ productivity, albeit with no effect on absence rates.  The findings therefore suggest that firms are 
likely to use objective and subjective PRP schemes in tandem in order to counteract any possible 
dysfunctional responses on behalf of their workforce (e.g. intertemporal allocation of effort).  It is also 
found that public sector firms and those which have interdependent production should be wary of using 
PRP as an absence control tool. 
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1. Introduction 
The examination of the effect of monetary incentives on firm performance and worker productivity lies at 
the heart of the principles of economics.  According to the principal-agent paradigm (Mirlees, 1976; 
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987), in the face of asymmetric information firms should tie the remuneration 
of employees to any verifiable (individual or collective) signal of performance.  Based on such a 
theoretical prediction, a number of studies in recent years have shown that, when implemented “wisely”, 
financial incentives have the potential to exert strong effects on indicators of firm performance, such as 
productivity (Lazear, 2000; Gielen et al., 2009) and worker absenteeism (Wilson and Peel, 1991; Brown 
et al., 1999).  Nevertheless, it has also been argued that improperly designed monetary rewards are likely 
to spur dysfunctional behavioural responses on behalf of workers, especially by those who multitask 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992), are members of teams (Drago and Garvey, 1997) or are 
subjected to subjective evaluations by superiors (Prendergast, 1999).  Such inefficient reactions are 
believed to underpin the weak (or even negative) association of PRP schemes with organisational 
performance found by some researchers (Marsden and French, 1998; Benson and Brown, 2000).  
Furthermore, many have stressed the free riding problems of “collective” incentive plans, such as profit-
related pay and share ownership (Prendergast, 1999; Oyer, 2004).  
The widespread employment in the UK of various types of financial incentives that complement the 
base pay of employees has been extensively noted (Pendleton et al, 2009).  Such forms of performance-
related pay (PRP) have typically taken the form of either individual or (increasingly) group incentives tied 
to objective or subjective evaluations of workers‟ effort (e.g. payment by results, merit pay), or of 
collective schemes based on more aggregate measures of firm profitability (bonuses, profit-sharing, share-
ownership, deferred profit-sharing).  However, due to data constraints many studies in the past have 
examined the impact of a catch-all measure of PRP on a single indicator of firm performance (Brown, 
1992; Booth and Frank, 1999), or in specific industries (Wilson and Peel, 1991; Brown et al., 1999).  This 
has resulted in the confounding of the effect of individual measures of PRP on firm performance in most 
 3 
cases, and has prohibited the detection of the exact incentive or disincentive power of distinct types of 
PRP schemes on various aspects of firm management. 
This paper attempts instead to examine the effect of a wide and heterogeneous set of PRP on two 
indicators of firm performance, namely the absence rate and labour productivity.  It uses two cross-
sections (1998 and 2004) of the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS), which enable the 
simultaneous examination of the potentially distinct impact of a variety of PRP instruments on multiple 
indicators of firm profitability.  The WERS is a representative dataset of British establishments that 
permits the consideration of an extensive amount of firm heterogeneity and the matching of employee-
workplace information when necessary.   
The study shows that, ceteris paribus, firms that employ PRP wage schemes that are tied primarily to 
the subjective assessment of individual merit are characterized by significantly lower absence rates.  
Interesting disparities in the intensity of the negative impact of PRP on absenteeism are nonetheless 
detected, which depend on the extent of public-private status, teamwork and other features of firm 
production technology.  
 Importantly, it is found that even though subjective merit schemes have a beneficial impact on worker 
absenteeism, this does not necessarily translate into higher labour productivity.  The reverse holds true for 
performance-contingent rewards that are explicitly linked to employee outputs, and rely less heavily on 
the input of time.  The findings of the paper therefore support the “informativeness principle” 
(Holmstrom, 1979), which suggests that firms are likely to benefit from tying employee remuneration to 
alternative signals of performance.  Nevertheless, to the extent that work attendance is weakly related to 
the effort process, an inefficient resource allocation may result as subjective incentive plans are likely to 
provoke opportunistic behavior on behalf of the workforce.         
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 reviews the hypothesized relation between 
performance pay and signals of firm performance, such as absenteeism and labour productivity.  Section 3 
provides a theoretical framework that underpins the empirical estimation.  Section 4 describes the data 
and presents descriptive statistics.  Section 5 presents the empirical estimates of the PRP-absenteeism 
 4 
relationship, and engages in a number of important robustness and sensitivity tests.  Section 6 investigates 
the effect of the varying PRP schemes on productivity.  Finally, Section 7 concludes with a discussion of 
the implications of the analysis for the design of optimal managerial policies by firms.    
 
2. PRP and Firm Performance 
2.1 Performance-related pay and productivity 
The bulk of the empirical evidence verifies that PRP is associated with substantially positive productivity 
effects (Prendergast, 1999).  For instance, Lazear (2000) reported a large increase of 44% in productivity 
in his case study of a firm that switched from fixed salaries to piece rates, attributing almost a third of this 
to selection effects.  Similarly, Paarsch and Shearer (2000) find a 22% increase in productivity in a 
Canadian firm, while Gielen et al. (2009) use a panel of Dutch firms to control for potential sorting 
effects following the introduction of PRP.  They find that accounting for fixed effects reduces the positive 
impact of PRP schemes on productivity from 12.4% to 9%.   
Despite the above convincing evidence, it is worth pointing out that a number of studies have failed to 
find a significant association between compensation and performance (Marsden and French, 1998; 
Benson and Brown, 2000; Kleiner et al., 2001).  Most of the existing research has also focused on 
individual-based PRP, such as piece rates, thereby omitting any important interactions between varying 
types of PRP on productivity.  Furthermore, with the exception of Kahn and Sherer (1990), there is a 
dearth of evidence on the effect of subjective PRP schemes on firm performance.  Numerous authors, 
though, have emphasized how a potentially dysfunctional behaviour by workers is likely to arise as a 
response to (non-linear) compensation contracts.  Asch (1990) and Oyer (1998), for example, have 
illustrated how intertemporal effort reallocation can occur between evaluation periods, while it has also 
been argued that subjective assessments give rise to the possibility of inefficient influence activities on 
behalf of employees who seek to curry favour with their superiors (Prendergast, 1999).          
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2.2 Performance-related pay and absenteeism 
There is an increasing amount of interest in recent years on the economics of absenteeism, spurred by a 
growing awareness that the economic and social costs of the phenomenon are large.
i
  Economists 
originally viewed the absence phenomenon as a manifestation of the labour supply decisions of 
employees (Allen, 1981; Leigh, 1985), paying greater attention to how hours of work adjust to wages, 
sick pay and to whether there is a “disciplining” impact of unemployment (Leigh, 1985; Barmby et al., 
1994; Arai and Thoursie, 2005; Askildsen et al. 2005).  Recently, economists have turned their focus to 
the demand side of the market, and most notably to aspects of the labour contract that affect the cost of 
absence [e.g. “assembly line” technology (Coles and Tremble, 1996; Coles et al., 2007), teamwork 
(Heywood and Jirjahn, 2004; Heywood et al., 2008), and firm size (Barmby and Stephan, 2000)].   
Despite the fact that Allen (1981) identified merit wage increases and attendance bonuses as two of the 
main “weapons” that firms can use to raise the penalty of absence to their employees, an examination of 
the impact of PRP schemes on absence rates has been relatively sparse in the literature.  The PRP-
absenteeism nexus may nonetheless offer useful insights into the inter-relationship between firm 
technologies, personnel policies and the behavioural reactions of workers.        
According to the standard principal-agent model, it is predicted that the total number of working hours 
will rise as workers respond optimally to the receipt of PRP, thus bridging the gap between contractual 
and actual hours.  The absence rate of firms offering performance-contingent pay is therefore likely to be 
lower than of those who pay fixed salaries, all other things equal.  This conclusion is reinforced when one 
considers the implications of Lazear‟s (1986) model, which predicts that hard-working/diligent/healthier 
employees will self-select into PRP firms.  Indeed, due to the greater effort and/or ability of those on 
incentive pay, a positive relationship between PRP and earnings (Seiler, 1984; Booth and Frank, 1999) 
has been reported in the literature.  To the extent that the surplus earnings obtained via PRP is typically 
not covered by the sick pay arrangements of firms (Barmby et al., 1991), workers will thus be 
incentivized to reduce the number of hours that they do not show up at work.   
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PRP schemes constitute part of a bundle of human resource management innovations that are 
associated with the so-called new high performance workplace practices (HPWPs).  Indeed, it has been 
argued that most of the positive effect of PRP on productivity can be indirectly attributed to the fact that 
its introduction is often a facilitator of other wider management and organizational changes (OECD, 
2005).  Since HPWPs are believed to breed greater feelings of employee empowerment and job 
satisfaction (Bauer, 2004), absenteeism may be negatively related to PRP via such an avenue.   
Despite the above conjectures, the provision of PRP is likely to result in an increase in absence for a 
number of reasons.  PRP schemes may undermine valuable teamwork by fostering an individualistic 
organizational culture that is permeated by envy and free-riding (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Drago and 
Garvey, 1998).  Furthermore, high-powered PRP systems are believed to heighten the power asymmetry 
between supervisors and the workforce (Kohn, 1993).  Psychological concerns over a potential 
“crowding-out” of intrinsic motivation have been raised, with assumed adverse effects on productivity 
and turnout at work (Frey and Jegen, 2001).  In general, the use of PRP has been associated with 
dissatisfaction with the amount of stress experienced by workers (Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2009), an 
increased incidence of workplace injuries (Freeman and Kleiner, 2005) and low morale (Bewley, 1999).   
From the conflicting hypotheses outlined above, it becomes evident that there is no consensus 
regarding the overall effect of PRP on absenteeism.  Interestingly, the lack of agreement on the direction 
of the effect is also mirrored in the empirical evidence, with some studies confirming the beneficial 
impact of financial rewards on absence rates (Wagner and Bankshares, 1990; Wilson and Peel, 1991; 
Brown et al., 1999; Arthur and Jelf, 1999; Jacobson, 1989; Hassink and Koning, 2005), while others   
emphasizing that there are non-measurable effects (Wolf, 1974; Schnebller and Kopelman, 1983; 
Engellandt and Riphahn, 2004).  The latter have typically focused on the significant hidden absenteeism 
costs associated with the use of performance pay, such as free-riding within teams, the time inconsistency 
problems arising when offering longer-term bonuses to temporary contract employees, and the perverse 
reactions of workers to capped bonuses that are stretched over extended qualifying time periods.  For 
 7 
instance, workers are found to „backload‟ their absence days towards periods in which they anticipate to 
have met their targets (Frick et al., 2008).  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
Following Heywood and Jirjahn (2004), assume that N identical workers, who face a probability m (0 < m 
< 1) of being monitored by their firm, maximize their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function by 
choosing their optimal absence level, ]1,0[a :  
)1()()()1()()1( aCRamUwUmaWUa s                (1) 
where those who exert the contracted amount of effort receive an overall wage rate W, as opposed to 
workers on “authorized” absence who receive sick pay, ws.  R is the reservation wage, obtained when an 
“unauthorized” absentee worker is caught shirking, and C(.) is a convex function that captures the 
disutility of effort ( 0,0  CC ).       
To combat moral hazard, firms are likely to condition their employees‟ remuneration to signals of their 
effort, such as the amount of actual man-hours that they are present in the workplace.  Substituting a 
simple linear PRP scheme, given by )1( abwW  , into (1), and maximization of the latter with 
respect to a implies: 
*)1()()()1()(*)1()( aCRmUwUmbWUaWU               (2) 
It is therefore evident that in equilibrium workers equalize the marginal cost of exerting effort to the 
marginal gain from not being absent.  This is given by the difference between the utility of the overall 
wage (base salary and bonus pay) and the sum of reservation utility and sick pay, where the latter is a 
fraction, δ, only of the base component of income (i.e. wws  ).  In this way the model captures an 
important element of the incentive power of PRP, namely that since bonus pay is typically not covered (or 
partly covered) by the sickness insurance arrangements of firms (Barmby et al., 1991), the shadow price 
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of absence is attenuated by the offer of incentive pay that supplements the usual fixed salary of employees 
[ 0
*



b
a
].        
Firms recognize that the absence rate of employees diminishes with the payment of a bonus, and sets b 
so that the increased wage bill is balanced by the marginal gain of reduced absence.  If otherwise identical 
firms produce output Q, then expected profit is given by:    
NmZNmawNaabwaPQ )()1(**)1*)](1([*)1(      (3) 
where P is the final product price, N is the total number of workers, while firms incur a cost of monitoring 
Z(m) ( )0,0  ZZ .  In the short-run, where firms can only alter the intensity of PRP rather than the 
number of employees, maximization of the expected profit yields:  
N
b
a
abNaN
b
a
mww
b
a
PQ
b 









 *
*)1(2*)1(]
*
)]1([
* 2    (4) 
So in equilibrium the firm selects b so that the increase in expected revenue plus the gain in reduced sick 
pay associated with reduced absence is equal to the marginal cost of providing PRP.  Comparing (4) to 
the optimal profit condition of firms that pay a non-variable salary, it becomes evident that PRP firms will 
only be willing to sustain the higher marginal wage costs in equilibrium if 
**
NoPRPPRP aa  .  
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our data are derived from the 1998 and 2004 Cross-Section Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
(WERS).  These are the fourth and fifth instalments of a Government funded series of surveys conducted 
at British workplaces.  The previous surveys were conducted in 1980, 1984 and 1990.
ii
  
The sample of workplaces was randomly drawn from the Interdepartmental Business Register 
(IDBR).  This is maintained by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and is considered to be the 
highest quality sampling frame of workplaces available in the United Kingdom.  The sample is stratified 
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by workplace size and industry and larger workplaces and some industries are overrepresented (Chaplin et 
al., 2005).  A workplace is defined as the activities of a single employer at a single set of premises.  
The survey comprises three main sections; the „Management Questionnaire‟ (face-to-face interviews 
with senior managers with day-to-day responsibility for employee relations), the „Worker Representative 
Questionnaire‟ and the „Employee Questionnaire‟.  The survey population for the Management 
Questionnaire is all British workplaces barring those in agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining 
and quarrying, private households with employed persons, and extra-territorial organisations.  
The response rate in the 1998 (2004) Management Questionnaire was 80% (64%).
iii
  Changes in the 
nature of interest in employment relations led to substantial redesign of the 2004 wave.  A major 
modification was the incorporation of small workplaces (i.e. those employing between 5 and 9 
employees).  There were also a number of changes to the format of the various survey questions (Kersley 
et al., 2006).  
For the purposes of our study we employ data primarily from the Management Questionnaire as the 
Employee Questionnaire or the Worker Representative Questionnaire do not offer any information on 
absence.  Thus, our 1998 (2004) sample comprises of 2,173 (2,006) establishments.  Due to the stratified 
nature of the survey, we weight our estimates in order to be representative of the sampling population.   
The Management Questionnaire collected data from managers about the pattern of employee non-
attendance in the workplace.  The exact question is phrased: “Over the past 12 months what percentage of 
work days was lost through employee sickness or absence at this establishment? Please exclude 
authorized leave or absence, employees away on secondment or courses, or days lost through industrial 
action”.iv  Among workplaces where managers were able to provide an answer, the average rate of 
absenteeism in 1998 (2004) equates to a loss of 3.8 (4.2) percent of working days per establishment.  
Figure 1 presents the distribution of absence rates across workplaces as reported in the two waves.  Both 
distributions are skewed to the right, but there is no excess concentration of zero observations.
 v
    
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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A new element of information in the 2004 WERS was the incorporation of the Financial 
Performance Questionnaire which collected data on objective measures of establishments‟ overall costs, 
revenues and employment.  Responses from a subset of 1070 UK firms were collected, based on those 
who gave their consent to matching their individual establishment information with the Annual Business 
Inquiry (ABI) survey (Forth and McNabb, 2008).  We have therefore used this data in order to construct 
two alternative measures of labour productivity namely the value-added per worker and profit per 
worker.   
Managers were also asked questions regarding the provision of different forms of variable pay 
schemes in their workplace.  Amongst these options the offer of PRP is explicitly identified, though it is 
specified in a different manner between the 1998 (individual or group PRP) and 2004 waves (payment by 
results and merit pay).  Table A1 in the Appendix provides a detailed set of definitions and descriptive 
statistics for the contingent pay variables of interest.  It is clear that a sizeable part of the 1998 and 2004 
samples contains firms that offer PRP of various types, such as individual or group PRP (28.1%) in the 
1998 wave, and payment by results (32.8%) or merit pay (23.7%) in 2004.       
To acquire an initial picture of the relationship between the absence rate, productivity and the various 
mechanisms of incentive pay, Table 1 provides some simple cross-tabulations of these variables.  The 
table suggests that all PRP schemes are associated with lower absence rates, though only payment by 
results is associated with a substantially higher mean value of (log) labour productivity.  Overall, these 
results tentatively appear to be consistent with the theoretical prediction that firms which offer financial 
incentives are expected to have lower absence rates and higher productivity, though they  also highlight 
an important discrepancy with respect to the distinct impact of either objective or subjective types of PRP.  
   [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
In order to detect the ceteris paribus relation between financial incentives and the absence rate, a 
number of important determinants of the latter are taken into account.  As identified in the relevant 
literature (e.g. Heywood et al., 2008), these include variables describing the demographic composition of 
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the workforce (e.g. proportions of employees by gender, age, ethnicity and disability status), working 
time schedules (e.g. whether employees engage in shift work, entitlement to the option of an annualized 
hours scheme, share of workers on part-time contracts), firm identity (establishment/organization size, 
years of operation), the nature of production (e.g. public-private status, industrial groupings, shares of 
occupational groups, “just-in-time” technology, degree of teamwork, degree of monitoring), contractual 
flexibility (proportion of employees on fixed term contracts and temporary agency employees), economic 
incentives (share of employees within various earnings bands, unemployment rate by travel to work area, 
provision of sick pay in excess of statutory requirements), the quality of industrial relations (trade union 
density, presence of joint consultative committees/health and safety committees/briefing groups, quality 
of relations between management and employees) and regional dummies. 
Relative to the absence regressions, a parsimonious control set is used instead for the productivity 
estimation, including variables such as size of the firm, size of the organization, nature of the production 
(industry dummies), occupational and demographic composition of the workforce, if the establishment 
offers briefing groups, teamwork, age of the establishment, ownership of the establishment, training, and 
the log of capital/labour ratio. 
Summary statistics of all variables of interest are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 
5. Effect of PRP on Absence Rates 
5.1 Main empirical findings 
Our absence equation of interest is as follows:  
jjjjjjj RIWVPPRPAbsence   543210                      (5) 
The dependent variable jAbsence  indicates the absence rate of establishment j, where  j = 1,…,N, jPRP  
captures the offer of PRP schemes within the establishments, VPj is a vector of other types of variable pay 
schemes offered by firms (e.g. profit pay, share ownership, cash bonuses, deferred profit plans), jW  
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summarizes various workplace characteristics, jI captures industry fixed effects, jR  stands for region 
fixed effects and j  is the establishment-specific error term.  As is standard, unbiased ordinary least 
squares (OLS) coefficients of the effect of PRP on Absence will be obtained provided 
that 0)|( jj PRPE  .  OLS may nevertheless not be appropriate given that jAbsence  is a fractional 
response variable, in which case Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggest that a logistic model may be more 
suitable.  However, in the empirical estimates discussed below, no significant differences are detected 
between the estimates of the logistic and OLS models.
vi
   
For this reason, Table 2 presents the estimated OLS effect of the main PRP and other variable pay 
variables on the absenteeism of British establishments for both years of data.
vii
  It is evident that after 
holding constant various other types of financial incentives that firms employ, PRP emerges as a scheme 
that exerts an independent and significant negative effect on the mean absence records of British 
establishments.                                 
Specifically, column 1 in the top panel of Table 2 suggests that, ceteris paribus, firms which offer 
“individual or group performance-related schemes” in the 1998 dataset have a 0.6 percentage point lower 
absence rate compared to firms without such schemes.  For a mean absence rate of 3.8 percentage points 
(sample absence mean in 1998), the true effect is therefore equal to -15.8 [(-0.6/3.8)*100]} percentage 
points, which is a considerable amount.  A significant negative effect on absenteeism of a slightly lower 
magnitude (-13.2%) is also found with respect to the provision of “other cash bonuses” by firms.  In 
contrast, no evidence of a link between absence and various forms of collective PRP schemes (profit pay, 
share ownership) is discovered.    
Column 2 in the upper panel of Table 2 presents similar results from the 2004 data, although the PRP 
variable is defined differently.  The results offer further support to the argument that linking employees‟ 
pay to performance is likely to have an effect on their absence behavior, with the magnitude of the effect 
corresponding closely to that of the 1998 sample.  Specifically, the overall PRP variable is broken down 
into its two constituent parts, namely payment by results and merit pay.  Furthermore, since merit pay is 
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only relevant for non-managerial occupational groups, the sample is restricted accordingly by excluding 
the subset of firms that offer PRP only to managerial employees (i.e. 115 establishments).  Interestingly, 
it is found that in the 2004 data PRP exerts a significant negative effect on absenteeism only when 
rewards are made contingent on the subjective evaluation of employees‟ merit.   
In particular, the regression coefficient suggests that establishments which offer merit pay have a 0.7 
percentage point lower number of lost workdays than establishments which do not offer such 
compensation.  For a mean absence rate of 4.2 percentage points (sample absence mean in 2004), this 
translates to a decrease of 16.7 [(-0.7/4.2)*100)] percentage points in the absence rate.   
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Delving more into the nature of the various methods of incentive pay that modern competitive 
organizations employ, we take into consideration that there are potentially significant interactions 
between them.  In the spirit of Pendleton et al. (2009), we explore the possibility that establishments 
make use of more than one type of variable pay and also that they may utilize alternative configurations 
of the different reward mechanisms at their disposal.  For instance, firms may use merit pay to target 
individual productivity, whilst offering profit-related pay to strengthen the commitment of the workforce 
towards the organization‟s goals.   
The estimated effects where the number of different variable pay schemes a given establishment may 
have on offer is measured are presented at the bottom of Table 2.  It is evident in both waves that the 
higher the number of such schemes used by an establishment, the greater is the effect on its absence rate.  
The 1998 results indicate that the effect of having five PRP schemes is more than double the effect of 
having only one such scheme in place.  Having five PRP schemes reduces the establishment absence rate 
by as much as 39.5 percentage points.  The equivalent finding from the 2004 wave (three schemes) 
indicates that firms which employ multiple forms of non-standard wage schemes are likely to benefit 
from a lower amount of lost workdays by around 28.6 percentage points. 
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The extensive information available in the WERS data permits the further investigation of the impact 
of the coverage of PRP schemes on absenteeism.  Specifically, managers were asked to reply to the 
question: “What proportion of non-managerial employees at this workplace have received performance 
related pay in the last 12 months?”viii  The available responses are then grouped into three broad 
categories: “1-39%”, “40-79%” and “80-100%”, the omitted category being “None”.  The results (see 
Table 3), especially those of the 2004 wave, are indicative of the fact that firms that have more extensive 
coverage of PRP are likely to enjoy lower absence rates. 
Finally, it is possible to scrutinize further what is the measure of performance which is most likely to 
trigger the significant negative impact of PRP on absenteeism.  In particular, managers were asked to 
unveil whether the amount of PRP that their employees receive is determined on the basis of (i) 
“Individual performance/output”; (ii) “Group or team performance/output”; (iii) “Workplace based 
measures”; (iv) “Organization based measures”, or (v) “Other measures”.ix  The 1998 results suggest that 
individual performance output and workplace-based measures are those that are associated with lower 
absence rates.  Results from the 2004 sample, instead, imply that merit pay is likely to reduce absence 
rates when it is tied to workplace and organization-based objectives (see Table 3).  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
5.2 Effects by public-private status 
Despite being used more commonly in the British public sector in recent years, the value of PRP remains 
modest relative to the private sector (OECD, 2005).  Significant attention has therefore been paid to 
understanding the reasons for the relatively infrequent use of explicit incentives in the public sector 
(Dixit, 2002; Burgess and Rato, 2003; Prendergast, 2008).
x
  Indeed, it is confirmed in the data that public 
sector establishments have a lower incidence of PRP schemes (30%) as opposed to the private sector 
(52%).  
Due to the distinct nature of incentive provision in public and private sector establishments, salient 
differences between the two sectors in the impact of PRP on worker absenteeism are expected.  This a 
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priori hypothesis is confirmed in Table 4, as it is shown that the positive worker attendance effect related 
to the use of individual or merit PRP is only relevant for private sector firms.  In contrast, deferred profit 
sharing plans are found to be a significant absence control tool for companies in the public sector.  This is 
reasonable, given that the service-incremental salary scales and long-term job attachments that typically 
characterize state employees are necessary conditions for tilted compensation profiles to provide effective 
incentives.   
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
5.3 Interaction with teamwork  
While the effectiveness of compensation schemes that rely heavily on teamwork hinges critically on the 
„silent‟ constraining effect of peer pressure (Kandel and Lazear, 1992), the evidence of Frick et al. (2008) 
and Dale-Olsen (2009) suggests that teamwork may be combined with PRP to significantly raise absence 
rates.  This is attributed to the fact that since team production units can cover for absent colleagues 
without undue disruption in output, workers who anticipate meeting their production targets are likely to 
free-ride by taking unauthorized absence.      
It is therefore of interest to examine closely the interrelationship between teamwork, the provision of 
performance pay and absenteeism.  In fact, the positive interaction term shown in Table 5 suggests that 
the sensitivity of absence to PRP is muted in firms with interdependent production.  This provides 
evidence in favour of the opportunistic conduct of workers hypothesis, and implies that firms that are 
dependent on the productive collaborations of workers should exercise caution when deciding whether to 
implement a PRP scheme. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
5.4 Other interaction effects and robustness checks 
A number of further sensitivity tests have been carried out in order to verify that the negative effect of 
PRP is robust, as shown in Table 5.
xi
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First, given that reliable estimation of an absence equation hinges critically on correctly identified 
variation in earnings and working hours, the estimation has been replicated by matching to the 
establishments an average measure of hours and earnings from the Employee Questionnaire.  The 
significant effect of the PRP variables in both waves remains unaffected.  It is also found that the impact 
of PRP is more (less) pronounced in firms which have a greater share of lower (higher)-paid workers, 
presumably due to the greater incentive power that an additional unit of PRP is likely to have on workers 
on the lower rungs of the income distribution.  Moreover, the positive interaction effect between PRP, the 
duration of hours and the share of employees working overtime signifies a diminishing impact of PRP on 
absenteeism once the gap between contractual and actual working hours is narrowed.  
As the effect of PRP may be confounded by the fact it usually acts as a lever for organizational 
change, it has been interacted with a dummy variable identifying firms that did not introduce important 
organizational changes in recent years.
xii
  It is found in the 2004 data that the negative effect of PRP on 
absence is diminished for such establishments, which implies that the effect is conditional on PRP acting 
as a stimulus for the introduction of broader managerial changes.      
  Despite the fact that in recent years PRP has generally been introduced alongside other innovative 
HR practices that have emphasized the promotion of employee empowerment, no significant interaction 
between PRP and the existence of briefing groups and joint consultative committees is detected.  
However, in the 2004 data the negative effect of merit pay on absenteeism is moderated within firms that 
operate so-called quality circles.  This is likely to reflect that problem-solving groups may comprise a 
performance-enhancement practice used by firms that acts as a substitute to PRP.     
The incidence of absence in larger-sized firms is typically higher due to the fact that it is more 
difficult to monitor the behavior of workers and because of the “buffer stock” of available employees that 
such firms can afford to employ (Barmby and Stephan, 2000).  The interaction between PRP and the size 
of the firm, however, indicates that it is smaller-sized establishments that are more likely to benefit from 
using PRP as an absence control instrument, presumably because of their lower productivity (Gielen et 
al., 2009).           
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5.5 Endogeneity of PRP and absence 
Despite the robustness of the negative PRP coefficient in the absence regression, the possibility that 
endogeneity and reverse causation underlie the significant correlation should be recognized.  An 
important criticism regarding the detection of the „causal‟ effect of PRP on firm performance is that cross-
section estimates are likely to mask unobserved firm heterogeneity (e.g. propensity of employees to be ill) 
and inherent differences in the trend of productivity, which are correlated with the introduction of PRP 
contracts (Prendergast, 1999, p. 43).  For instance, it is probable that lower absence rates may be 
unrelated to the choice of PRP by firms per se, and reflect, instead, a historically rising trend of 
productivity that is correlated with the adoption and implementation of costly variable pay schemes.  
Another important avenue giving rise to a negative correlation between PRP and absenteeism is via the 
mediating effect of another potentially endogenous variable, namely firm monitoring.  Specifically, firms 
which face a higher rate of absenteeism are more likely to utilize extensive monitoring rather than PRP, as 
a means of counteracting non-attendance.    
   In order to address the aforementioned concerns, the specification has been initially augmented 
with additional important control variables, as shown in Table 6.  First, given that the dependent variable 
refers to workdays lost through both employee sickness or absence, two additional regressors have been 
added to the regression that capture the proportion of employees that have sustained certain types of 
injuries (e.g. bone fracture, amputation, loss of sight etc.) or illnesses/disabilities/other physical problems 
(e.g. skin or respiration problems, stress, musculoskeletal disorders) during working hours in the previous 
year of the survey.  Since the impact of PRP remains unaffected, this constitutes evidence that the 
beneficial attendance effect of PRP is not likely to have arisen because of sorting of healthier workers into 
firms that offer PRP.  
Extra controls capturing the managers‟ subjective (1998 and 2004) and objective (2004) evaluation of 
current labour productivity within the establishment have also been considered (see Table 6).  In addition, 
the 1998 dataset contains the managers‟ subjective evaluation of whether labour productivity in their 
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establishment has gone up or down compared with five years ago.  In all cases no evidence is found that 
would imply that the effect of PRP on absenteeism is somehow modified by the fact that firm productivity 
or its trend is likely to be correlated with both the adoption of PRP schemes and lower absence rates. 
The significant negative effect of PRP on absenteeism persists even after the inclusion of an ordinal 
monitoring variable in the main regression as a further exogenous variable (see Table 6).  In addition, 
using the methodology of Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988) it is tested whether 
there is any correlation between the errors of the structural equation of absence, j , and those of two 
reduced-form regression equations, one for the provision of PRP (probit) and another for the existence of 
monitoring in the workplace (ordered probit).  As is common, the above procedure requires the inclusion 
of the (generalized) residuals (Gourieroux et al., 1987) of the reduced form equations as additional 
covariates in an auxiliary absence equation.  The presence of endogeneity in the OLS coefficients of PRP 
and monitoring is then detected via a test of the joint significance of the coefficients of the two residual 
terms.  Identification is achieved via inclusion in each reduced form equation of a set of exogenous 
variables that are strongly related to either of the two endogenous terms, but is uncorrelated with the 
absence rate.   
Due to space limitations, a detailed account of this testing procedure is provided in the Appendix.  It 
is emphasized in column (4) of Table 6, though, that the residuals obtained from the PRP and monitoring 
reduced form equations are insignificant variables when inserted into the main absence equation as 
extraneous controls.  A test of their joint significance also fails to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity 
of the two variables [F(2,2087) = 0.68 (1998); F(2,1432) = 0.25 (2004)] .   
Despite evidence against the hypothesis of endogeneity, a “treatment effects” model has nonetheless 
been estimated that takes into account the binary nature of the endogenous PRP variable.  The same set of 
instruments as described in the Appendix has been used.  In both waves, the statistically significant 
negative effects of the PRP variables on absenteeism are found to persist, while the magnitude of the 
coefficients almost doubles (see column (5) of Table 6).    
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 [INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
6. Effect of PRP on Productivity  
Given the findings that individual-based, subjective PRP schemes are likely to have a beneficial effect on 
lost man-hours, this section estimates the effect of the varying types of PRP measures on labour 
productivity.  As noted before, although the absence behavior of workers may constitute an informative 
signal of employee effort to firms, tying the pay of employees to such a measure will only be optimal if 
physical presence in the job translates into higher productivity.
xiii
  If this condition is not satisfied, this is 
indicative of opportunistic or multitasking behavior on behalf of employees.  Of course, a firm that is 
concerned with various indicators of performance, such as absenteeism and productivity, may nonetheless 
decide to employ both objective and subjective schemes of performance-contingent pay in equilibrium, 
albeit with a different intensity of either of the two.    
Two objective measures of worker productivity are employed, namely value added per worker and 
profit per worker, while the analysis is also replicated using a subjective measure of productivity as 
reported by the managers for robustness purposes (Forth and McNabb, 2008).  The estimated relationship 
of interest is as follows:        
uVPPRPoductivity jjjj  3210)ln(Pr        (6) 
where Ψ captures various determinants of firm productivity, as described in Section 4.   
Table 7 indicates that there is a significant discrepancy with respect to the effectiveness of various 
types of PRP on absenteeism and labour productivity.  Financial rewards that are tied to the production of 
output (rather than to the input of time), such as payment by results, are shown to have a significant 
positive effect on labour productivity, even though no corresponding impact is detected in terms of 
absenteeism (as identified in Table 2).  In fact, the positive impact of payment by results on labour 
productivity is found to range from 6.2% (subjective measure) to as much as 10.7% (profit per worker).  
In contrast, merit pay, although shown to reduce rates of absence (Table 2), has no analogous impact on 
the productivity of workers (neither by itself nor when interacted with the payment by results variable).       
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[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]   
This finding has important policy implications for firms and indicates that organizations are likely to 
employ a multitude of objective and subjective incentive mechanisms in order to address a different set of 
problems associated with their performance.  For instance, it is likely that the offer of payment by results 
may offer ample scope to workers to engage in the opportunistic intertemporal allocation of effort as 
identified in the multitasking literature, whereby workers „backload‟ their absence days once a given set 
of targets are achieved.  The use of subjective performance evaluations is then likely to be used to combat 
such phenomena, to the extent, of course, that a lower absence rate is beneficial to the overall 
performance of a company.  This might be true as lower absenteeism might imply efficiency gains that 
are not necessarily related to a higher value-added per worker (e.g. a lower burden of sickness insurance 
costs, positive effect on work climate, avoidance of bottlenecks in team production).     
 
7. Conclusion 
Using two cross-sections (1998 and 2004) of a representative dataset of British establishments, the effect 
of various forms of incentive pay (e.g. PRP, profit-sharing, share ownership, cash bonuses) on the 
absence rates and productivity of firms is investigated.  Incentives that are tightly linked to the subjective 
evaluation of individual merit are found to be significantly related to lower absenteeism, though not to 
higher labour productivity.  The reverse effect is found for those PRP schemes that are conditioned on 
more quantifiable outputs, rather than to the input of time.  The findings of the paper therefore explain 
why firms are likely to benefit from tying employee pay to both objective and subjective signals of 
performance.  Indeed, given the well-known ingenuity of workers who are likely to game any 
compensation plan to their advantage, firms which will only rely on subjective evaluations of 
performance are likely to find that the physical attendance of the workforce does not necessarily translate 
into higher output per worker, whereas paying workers on the basis of their physical output is likely to 
give rise to an intertemporal allocation of effort.    
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The conclusion that some types of PRP are associated with lower absence rates or higher 
productivity, however, does not imply that all firms should employ PRP as an absence control or 
productivity-enhancement tool.  Whether PRP is a suitable compensation strategy ultimately depends on 
the production technology of enterprises.  For example, it was shown in the paper that the negative effect 
of PRP on absence is only found in private sector firms, and those that do not rely heavily on teamwork.  
Public sector firms and those which have interdependent production should therefore be wary of using 
PRP to combat absenteeism.   
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Figure 1. Distribution of Workplace Absence Rate in the 1998 WERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Work Days Lost Through Employee Sickness or Absence by Type of Variable Pay Scheme 
 1998 2004 
 Yes No Yes No 
 Absence Absence Absence Productivity Absence Productivity 
PRP       
Individual or 
group PRP 
0.034 
(0.029) 
0.040 
(0.052) 
--- --- --- --- 
Payment by 
result 
--- --- 0.038 
(0.047) 
5.98 
(0.60) 
0.044 
(0.066) 
5.87 
(0.53) 
Merit pay --- --- 0.036 
(0.046) 
5.92 
(0.47) 
0.044 
(0.064) 
5.90 
(0.57) 
Collective 
PRP  
      
Profit related 
pay 
0.036 
(0.034) 
0.039 
(0.053) 
0.038 
(0.051) 
5.93 
(0.45) 
0.044 
(0.065) 
5.89 
(0.59) 
Employee 
share 
ownership 
schemes 
0.038 
(0.044) 
0.038 
(0.047) 
--- --- --- --- 
Other 
Variable Pay 
      
Deferred 
profit sharing 
scheme 
0.036 
(0.033) 
0.038 
(0.047) 
--- --- ---- --- 
Other cash 
bonus 
0.034 
(0.032) 
0.039 
(0.050) 
--- --- --- --- 
Notes. Means are weighted. Standard deviations in parentheses. “---” implies that the variable is not present in the respective 
wave.  Means are lower than in raw data because of recoding of missing values to zero.  The productivity figures are log values 
of value-added per worker, which are available only via the Financial Questionnaire in the WERS 2004 sample.   
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Table 2. Effect of Performance-Related Pay Schemes on Absence Rates 
 1998 2004 
Dependent Variable: Absence Rate   
PRP   
Individual or group PRP  -0.006** 
(0.002) 
--- 
Payment by result --- -0.002 
(0.003) 
Merit pay --- -0.007* 
(0.003) 
Collective PRP    
Profit related payments (or profit-related bonuses) -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Employee share ownership schemes 0.0002 
(0.004) 
--- 
Other Variable Pay   
Deferred profit sharing scheme -0.002 
(0.003) 
--- 
Other cash bonus -0.005* 
(0.002) 
--- 
Total Number of Incentive Pay Schemes in Firms   
1 -0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
2 -0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
3 -0.009+ 
(0.005) 
-0.012* 
(0.005) 
4 -0.014* 
(0.006) 
--- 
5  -0.015+ 
(0.008) 
--- 
Number of observations 2,173 2,006 
Notes: Full controls are included as in Table A3 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of 
significance: ** 1%, * 5%, + 10 %. “---” implies that the variable is not present in the respective wave.   
 
 
 
Table 3. Effect of Proportion of Non-Managerial Employees Who Received Performance-Related 
Pay in the Last 12 Months and Measure of Performance on Absence Rates  
Dependent Variable: Absence rate 1998 2004 
Proportion of PRP   
1% to 39%  -0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.0003 
(0.005) 
40% to 79% -0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.0001 
(0.005) 
80% to 100% -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
Measure of Performance   
Individual performance/output -0.009** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Group or team performance/output -0.004 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Workplace-based measures -0.012** 
(0.003) 
-0.007+ 
(0.004) 
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Organization-based measures -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.007+ 
(0.003) 
Number of observations 2,080 2,006 
Notes: Full controls are included as in Table A3 in the Appendix.  The “proportions” and “measures” dummy 
variables have been used in place of the “individual or group performance-related schemes” in the 1998 sample and 
the “merit pay” and “payment by results” variables in the 2004 sample. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
Omitted category: None of the workers at the workplace received PRP in the last 12 months.  Levels of significance: 
** 1%, * 5%, + 10 %. The number of observations (2,080) for the 1998 sample is less than the whole 1998 sample 
(2,173) as the “proportions” and “measures” variables refer to non-managerial employees only.  
   
 
 
Table 4. Estimates of Performance-related Pay Schemes on Absence Rates by Public-Private Status 
 1998 2004 
 Public Private Public Private 
PRP     
Individual or group 
PRP 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.003)** 
--- --- 
Payment by result 
--- --- 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Merit Pay 
--- --- 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.006 
(0.003)+ 
Collective PRP      
Profit Pay 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Employee 
Ownership 
--- 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
--- --- 
Other Variable Pay     
Deferred Profit 
-0.026 
(0.012)* 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
--- --- 
Other cash bonus 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003)* 
--- --- 
Notes: Full controls are included as in Table A3 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of 
significance: ** 1%, * 5%, + 10 %. “---” implies that the variable is not present in the respective wave.   
 
 
 
Table 5. Interaction Effects of Performance-related Pay Schemes on Absence Rates  
WERS 1998        
PRP (individual or group) 
-0.009 
(0.003)** 
-0.008 
(0.003)** 
-0.039 
(0.012)** 
-0.017 
(0.007)** 
-0.018 
(0.008)* 
-0.004 
(0.002)+ 
-0.004 
(0.002)* 
PRP*proportion employees earning 
£22-29k pa 
0.034 
(0.019)+     
  
PRP*proportion of employees 
earnings more than £29k pa  
0.028 
(0.016)+    
  
PRP*average duration of 
workweek (inc.overtime)   
0.001 
(0.000)**   
  
PRP*more than half of workforce 
on overtime    
0.017 
(0.009)+  
  
PRP*more than half of workforce 
in teams     
0.016 
(0.008)+ 
  
PRP*size of firm: 10-25      
-0.016 
(0.008)* 
 
PRP*size of firm: 26-50      
 -0.015 
(0.008)+ 
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WERS 2004        
Merit pay 
-0.006 
(0.003)* 
-0.011 
(0.003)** 
-0.007 
(0.003)* 
-0.011 
(0.003)**  
  
Merit pay*proportion employees 
paid less than $4.50 per hour 
-0.028 
(0.016)+     
  
Merit pay*team members jointly 
decide on work  
0.010 
(0.005)+    
  
Merit pay*no organizational 
changes in last two years   
0.017 
(0.009)+   
  
Merit pay*qualitycircles    
0.012 
(0.006)*  
  
Notes: Full controls are included as in Table A3 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of 
significance: ** 1%, * 5%, + 10 %.   
 
 
 
Table 6 Endogeneity of Performance-related Pay and Absence 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Control for 
Illnesses/Injuries  
Control for 
productivity 
Control for 
monitoring 
Testing for 
endogeneity 
Controlling for 
endogeneity 
WERS 1998      
Individual or 
group PRP 
-0.005 
(0.002)** 
--- 
-0.006 
(0.002)** 
-0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.016 
(0.006)** 
Monitoring: Less 
than half  
 --- 
0.006 
(0.003)* 
0.060 
(0.046)+ 
0.006 
(0.003)+ 
Monitoring: 
More than half 
 --- 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.042) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Residual PRP 
 ---  
0.002 
(0.005) 
 
Residual 
Monitoring 
 ---  
-0.021 
(0.020) 
 
Percent injured 
0.044 
(0.027) 
    
Percent ill 
0.152 
(0.050)** 
    
ρ     χ2(1) = 3.81+ 
N 2170 --- 2170 2170 2170 
WERS 2004      
Merit pay 
-0.007 
(0.003)* 
-0.011 
(0.004)* 
-0.006 
(0.003)+ 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
-0.010 
(0.006)+ 
Monitoring: Less 
than half  
  
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Monitoring: 
More than half 
  
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
Residual PRP 
   
0.004 
(0.001) 
 
Residual 
Monitoring 
   
-0.012 
(0.019) 
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Percent injured 
0.006 
(0.034) 
    
Percent ill 
0.072 
(0.028)** 
    
Log(productivity) 
 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
   
ρ     χ2(1) = 0.91 
N(Private sector)  940 1503 1503 1503 
Notes: Full controls are included as in Table A3 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels 
of significance: ** 1%, * 5%, + 10 %. ρ is the correlation coefficient between the PRP and absence equations.  The 
productivity variable captures the (log) value added per worker, and is available only for the 2004 wave.  Column 
(5) indicates estimates of a treatment effects model. 
 
 
 
Table 7 Effects of Performance-Related Pay Schemes on Labour Productivity – WERS 2004 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 OLS OLS Probit 
Dependent variable Log(value added productivity) Log(profit per worker) Subjective productivity 
Merit pay -0.028 
(0.038) 
-0.014 
(0.052) 
-0.013 
(0.033) 
Payment by result 0.097+ 
(0.058) 
0.107+ 
(0.062) 
0.062* 
(0.031) 
Profit related pay -0.041 
(0.057) 
-0.044 
(0.054) 
0.024 
(0.032) 
N 718 620 1976 
Notes:  
1. All specifications include the following controls: 11 industry dummies, 7 workplace size dummies, 4 organization size 
dummies, proportions of occupational groups in the establishment (9 variables), proportion of women, proportion of ethnic 
minorities, proportion of young and old employees, proportion of part time staff, proportion agency employees, proportion 
trade union members, briefing groups, teams jointly decide how the work is to be done, foreign owned establishment, UK and 
foreign owned establishment, old establishment, 6 dummies for employer training (omitted category, no training), 6 dummies 
for the proportion of workers who work overtime in excess of the normal working week, and log of capital/labour ratio (value 
of capital per worker). 
2. In the third column the subjective productivity variable takes the value of 1 if manager reports that productivity is a lot 
better/better than average compared with other establishments in the same industry, 0 otherwise. Reported estimates are the 
marginal effects. The third column does not include the log of capital/labour ratio as the dependent variable is a subjective 
measure of productivity. 
3. Estimates are weighted.  
4. Full regression results are available upon request.       
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APPENDIX 
 
Section A1. Definitions of the PRP variables of interest  
 
Definition of PRP from the 1998 WERS 
Do any employees at this workplace receive payment or dividends from any of the following variable pay schemes? 
1. Profit-related payments or bonuses (37.4%) 
2. Deferred profit sharing scheme (6.4%) 
3. Employee share ownership schemes (21.9%) 
4. Individual or group performance-related schemes (28.1%) 
5. Other cash bonus (25.6%) 
6. None of these (36.2%) 
 
Definition of PRP from the 2004 WERS 
Do any employees in this establishment get paid by results or receive merit pay?  
(Interviewer: On this card is an explanation of what we mean by payment by results and merit pay. Probe: Which 
others? Until “None”. 
1. Payment by results (32.8%) 
2. Merit pay (23.7%) 
3. Neither (49.9%) 
Card reads:  
1. Payment by results 
“Payment by results” includes any method of payment where he pay is determined by the amount done on its value, 
rather than just the number of hours worked. It includes commission, and bonuses that are determined by individual, 
establishment or organization productivity or performance. It includes profit-related pay schemes.  
2. Merit pay 
“Merit pay” is related to a subjective assessment of individual performance by a supervisor or manager.   
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Table A2. Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables of Interest  
 1998 2004 
Missing absence  0.157 
(0.364) 
0.154 
(0.361) 
Percent of employees earnings ₤22,000 to less than ₤29,000 per annum 0.086 
(0.112) 
0.071 
(0.177) 
Percent of managers 0.086 
(0.097) 
0.103 
(0.105) 
Percent of professional staff 0.129 
(0.208) 
0.109 
(0.191) 
Percent of technical staff 0.089 
(0.156) 
0.107 
(0.195) 
Percent of clerical and secretarial staff 0.157 
(0.193) 
0.151 
(0.206) 
Percent of craft and skilled service 0.104 
 (0.193) 
0.072 
(0.165) 
Percent of personal and protective service 0.083 
(0.206) 
0.075 
(0.204) 
Percent of operative and assembly staff 0.128 
 (0.248) 
0.096 
(0.215) 
Percent of sales staff 0.096 
(0.225) 
0.143 
(0.274) 
Percent of routine unskilled 0.124 
(0.221) 
0.136 
(0.257) 
Percent part time staff 0.263 
(0.282) 
0.268 
(0.277) 
Percent trade union staff 0.327 
(0.339) 
0.212 
(0.307) 
Percent of women 0.492 
(0.288) 
0.493 
(0.294) 
Percent of ethnic minorities 0.054 
(0.109) 
0.073 
(0.148) 
Percent of employees younger than 20 years old 0.061 
(0.108) 
0.090 
(0.151) 
Percent of employees older than 51 years old 0.157 
(0.109) 
0.200 
(0.154) 
Percent disable 0.009 
(0.026) 
0.010 
(0.040) 
Percent temporary agency employees 0.017 
(0.052) 
0.029 
(0.098) 
Between 5% and 25% of employee work on fixed-term contracts  0.515 
(0.500) 
0.407 
(0.491) 
More than 25% of employee work on fixed-term contracts 0.039 
(0.194) 
0.066 
(0.248) 
Manufacturing 0.226 
(0.419) 
0.156 
(0.363) 
Utilities (electricity, gas, water supply) 0.006 
(0.079) 
0.003 
(0.059) 
Construction 0.031 
(0.174) 
0.041 
(0.199) 
Wholesale 0.147 
(0.355) 
0.157 
(0.364) 
Hotels and restaurants 0.043 
(0.202) 
0.056 
(0.231) 
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Transportation 0.056 
(0.230) 
0.067 
(0.249) 
Financial services 0.037 
(0.188) 
0.058 
(0.234) 
Other businesses 0.098 
(0.298) 
0.136 
(0.343) 
Other community services 0.033 
(0.179) 
0.051 
(0.219) 
Education 0.105 
(0.306) 
0.083 
(0.276) 
Health 0.139 
(0.346) 
0.138 
(0.345) 
Public sector establishment 0.304 
(0.460) 
0.239 
(0.427) 
East Anglia 0.082 
(0.274) 
0.088 
 (0.284) 
Rest of the South East 0.145 
(0.352) 
0.137 
(0.343) 
South West 0.074 
(0.262) 
0.074 
(0.262) 
London 0.126 
(0.332) 
0.131 
(0.337) 
East Midlands 0.090 
(0.286) 
0.075 
(0.263) 
West Midlands 0.102 
(0.302) 
0.099 
(0.299) 
North East 0.047 
(0.211) 
0.039 
(0.194) 
North West 0.125 
(0.331) 
0.131 
(0.337) 
Scotland 0.094 
(0.292) 
0.095 
(0.293) 
Wales 0.042 
(0.201) 
0.044 
 (0.204) 
Sick pay in excess of statutory requirements 0.771 
(0.420) 
0.692 
(0.462) 
System designed to minimize inventories, supplies or work in progress 0.328 
(0.469) 
0.273 
(0.446) 
Operating at this address or other for more than 5 years 0.899 
(0.301) 
0.915 
(0.279) 
Size of the establishment between 5 and 10 employees --- 0.101 
(0.301) 
Size of the establishment between 10 and 25 employees 0.138 
(0.345) 
0.170 
(0.376) 
Size of the establishment between 26 and 50 employees 0.143 
(0.350) 
0.142 
(0.349) 
Size of the establishment between 51 and 100 employees 0.137 
(0.344) 
0.135 
(0.342) 
Size of the establishment between 101 and 200 employees 0.137 
(0.344) 
0.122 
(0.327) 
Size of the establishment between 201 and 500 employees 0.186 
(0.389) 
0.142 
(0.350) 
Size of the establishment between 501 and 1,000 employees 0.092 
(0.289) 
0.079 
(0.269) 
Organization size 200 to less than 1,000 employees 0.085 0.119 
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(0.278) (0.324) 
Organization size 1,000 to less than 5,000 employees 0.163 
(0.370) 
0.143 
(0.350) 
Organization size 5,000 to less than 50,000 employees  0.222 
(0.416) 
0.225 
(0.418) 
Organization size more than 50,000 employees 0.494 
(0.500) 
0.452 
(0.498) 
Working arrangements for non-managerial employees: annualised hours 0.097 
(0.296) 
0.143 
(0.351) 
Working arrangements for non-managerial employees: shift working 0.520 
(0.500) 
0.482 
(0.500) 
Specific health and safety committee 0.435 
(0.496) 
0.295 
(0.456) 
Teams jointly decide how the work is to be done  0.478 
(0.500) 
0.440 
(0.497) 
Joint consultative committee/work councils/representative forums 0.502 
(0.500) 
0.365 
(0.481) 
Briefing groups/team briefings  0.888 
(0.316) 
0.808 
(0.394) 
Relationship between management and employees is very good/good 0.862 
(0.346) 
0.897 
(0.305) 
Unemployment to vacancy rate by travel to work area 3.8 
(1.59) 
3.6 
(2.5) 
Foreign owned establishment --- 0.173 
(0.345) 
UK and foreign owned establishment --- 0.037 
(0.188) 
All (100%) employees have received training over the last 12 months --- 0.296 
(0.456) 
Almost all (80-99%) have received training over the last 12 months --- 0.125 
(0.331) 
Most (60-79%) have received training over the last 12 months --- 0.099 
(0.299) 
Half (40-59%) have received training over the last 12 months --- 0.097 
(0.296) 
Some (20-39%) have received training over the last 12 months --- 0.120 
(0.325) 
Few (1-19%) have received training over the last 12 months --- 0.139 
(0.346) 
All (100%) employees work overtime in excess of the normal working week --- 0.082 
(0.274) 
Almost all (80-99%) employees work overtime in excess of the normal 
working week 
--- 0.084 
(0.278) 
Most (60-79%) employees work overtime in excess of the normal working 
week 
--- 0.107 
(0.309) 
Half (40-59%) employees work overtime in excess of the normal working 
week 
--- 0.156 
(0.363) 
Some (20-39%) employees work overtime in excess of the normal working 
week 
--- 0.197 
(0.398) 
Few (1-19%) employees work overtime in excess of the normal working 
week 
--- 0.222 
(0.416) 
Log of capital/labour ratio (value of capital per worker) --- 3.103 
(1.566) 
Number of observations 2,173 2,006 
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Notes: Means are weighted.  Standard deviations in parentheses. “---” implies that the variable does not exist, or is not used in the 
1998 WERS. The mean of the Log of capital/labour ratio is estimated for 537 observations.  
 
Table A3. Effect of Control Variables on Absence Rates 
 1998 2004 
Dependent Variable: Absence Rate   
Missing absence (dummy)  -0.045** 
(0.002) 
-0.050** 
(0.002) 
Percent of employees earnings ₤22,000 to less than ₤29,000 per annum -0.023* 
(0.010) 
-0.018* 
(0.008) 
Percent of managers -0.005 
(0.010) 
0.022+ 
(0.013) 
Percent of professional staff 0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
Percent of technical staff 0.0003 
(0.008) 
-0.015+ 
(0.008) 
Percent of clerical and secretarial staff -0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
Percent of craft and skilled service 0.019* 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
Percent of personal and protective service 0.010 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
Percent of operative and assembly staff 0.019 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
Percent of sales staff 0.014 
(0.011) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
Percent of routine unskilled 0.022* 
(0.010) 
0.032** 
(0.011) 
Percent part time staff -0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
Percent trade union staff 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.021** 
(0.006) 
Percent of women 0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.015+ 
(0.008) 
Percent of ethnic minorities 0.066 
(0.041) 
0.029+ 
(0.016) 
Percent of employees younger than 20 years old 0.031+ 
(0.017) 
0.020 
(0.012) 
Percent of employees older than 51 years old -0.018 
(0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
Percent disable 0.034 
(0.035) 
0.008 
(0.029) 
Percent temporary agency employees -0.047 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
Between 5% and 25% of employee work on fixed-term contracts  0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
More than 25% of employee work on fixed-term contracts -0.003 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
Manufacturing 0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.007) 
Utilities (electricity, gas, water supply) -0.002 
(0.005) 
0.018 
(0.035) 
Construction -0.006 -0.004 
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(0.005) (0.009) 
Wholesale 0.0003 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
Hotels and restaurants -0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
Transportation 0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
Financial services 0.009+ 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
Other businesses 0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
Other community services -0.006 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
Education 0.005 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
Health -0.00002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
Public sector establishment 0.007+ 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
East Anglia -0.019* 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Rest of the South East -0.020+ 
(0.011) 
-0.0001 
(0.007) 
South West -0.018+ 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
London -0.025 
(0.017) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
East Midlands -0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
West Midlands -0.015 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
North East -0.017+ 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
North West -0.017+ 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Scotland -0.016+ 
(0.010) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
Wales -0.006 
(0.014) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
Sick pay in excess of statutory requirements 0.009* 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
System designed to minimize inventories, supplies or work in progress 0.001 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.003) 
Operating at this address or other for more than 5 years -0.018 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Size of the establishment between 5 and 10 employees --- 0.005 
(0.007) 
Size of the establishment between 10 and 25 employees 0.013+ 
(0.007) 
0.014+ 
(0.008) 
Size of the establishment between 26 and 50 employees 0.013* 
(0.006) 
0.011 
(0.007) 
Size of the establishment between 51 and 100 employees 0.009* 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
Size of the establishment between 101 and 200 employees 0.005 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
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Size of the establishment between 201 and 500 employees 0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.009+ 
(0.005) 
Size of the establishment between 501 and 1,000 employees 0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.006) 
Organization size 200 to less than 1,000 employees 0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
Organization size 1,000 to less than 5,000 employees 0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.009) 
Organization size 5,000 to less than 5,0000 employees  0.003 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
Organization size more than 50,000 employees 0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
Working arrangements for non-managerial employees: annualised hours -0.010** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
Working arrangements for non-managerial employees: shift working 0.006+ 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
Specific health and safety committee -0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
Teams jointly decide how the work is to be done  -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Joint consultative committee/work councils/representative forums 0.007* 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
Briefing groups/team briefings  -0.001 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
Relationship between management and employees is very good/good -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
Unemployment rate by travel to work area between 2% and 5% -0.006 
(0.005) 
0.0004 
(0.004) 
Unemployment rate by travel to work area above 5% -0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Number of observations 2,173 2,006 
Notes:  
1. The omitted categories are: no variably pay schemes, zero proportion of employees work on fixed term contracts, public 
administration, Yorkshire and Humberside, no sick pay in excess of statutory requirements, no system to minimize inventories, 
operating at this address or other less than 5 years, more than 1,000 employees at the establishment, less than 200 employees in 
the organization, no annualized hours, no shift working, general joint committee, team members do not jointly decide how the 
work is to be done, no joint consultative  committee, no briefing, relationship between management and employees is neither 
good nor bad/poor/poor/very poor, unemployment rate by travel to work area between 0 and 2 percent.  
2. Estimates are weighted and robust standard deviations in parentheses.   
3. “---” implies that the variable does not exist in the 1998 WERS.  
 
Section A4: Description of the IV Estimation Methodology 
 
In order to test whether PRP, monitoring (M) and absenteeism are endogenously related, the methodology proposed 
by Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988) is adopted.  This methodology seeks to identify whether 
there is any correlation between the errors of the structural equation of absence, j , and those of two reduced-form 
regression equations, one for the provision of PRP (probit) and another for the existence of monitoring (M) in the 
workplace (ordered probit).  Wooldridge (2002) has shown that provided that consistent coefficients of the first-
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stage equations are obtained, the estimated generalized residuals can be included as additional covariates in an 
augmented absence equation.  The presence of endogeneity in the OLS coefficients of PRPj and Mj is then detected 
via a test of the joint significance of the coefficients of the two residual terms. 
As part of the first-stage of the IV estimation, a regression equation describing the incidence of PRP has been 
fitted to the data using a probit estimator (see Table A4).  It is hence confirmed that extensive monitoring used by 
firms (proxied by a proportion of supervisors that exceeds half of the non-managerial workforce) is associated with a 
smaller probability of PRP being employed as a method of remuneration.   
In order to implement the testing procedure, the set of explanatory variables has also been augmented with a 
number of identifying restrictions.  These instrumental variables (IVs) are chosen to be strongly correlated with 
either of the two endogenous variables, but not related in any causal manner with the absence rate.  Although it is 
acknowledged that the selection of reliable instruments is a difficult and sometimes ad hoc process, the specific 
instruments used to identify the PRP equation are as follows; 1998 wave:  whether firms use individual or team 
objectives and targets as the main method to make employees in the largest occupational group aware of their job 
responsibilities; whether management introduced any change in the organization of work in the past five years.  
2004 wave: whether the organization is UK and foreign owned/controlled; and if a single individual or family own 
at least 50 percent of the company.  Similarly, the monitoring equation is identified with the addition of the 
following variables that we anticipate to influence monitoring:  1998 wave:  management did not introduce any 
change in the past five years; 2004 wave: Manager is the proprietor/owner of the firm. 
This choice of the aforementioned instruments can be justified as it is expected that firms which employ 
individual/team objectives, those which have undergone organizational changes in the recent past, and those whose 
ownership transcends domestic barriers, are more likely to use innovative compensation rewards, such as PRP.  By 
contrast, the nature of incentive provision within establishments that are predominantly owned by a single individual 
or family is expected to be geared by factors other than financial rewards.  Similarly, companies which did not 
undertake any significant changes in previous years, and those in which the manager is concurrently the owner of 
the firm, are less likely to require supervising employees.  As shown in Table A4, these a priori expectations are 
confirmed.   
In addition, there is no strong reason to believe that these variables are causally related to the (present) absence 
record of establishments.  Indeed, the lack of correlation between the selected IVs and absenteeism is confirmed via 
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separate OLS absenteeism regressions that include the IVs as extra controls in the specification (available upon 
request).  In all cases the selected IVs are found to be unrelated to absenteeism, at statistical significance levels that 
exceed by far what are regarded to be acceptable thresholds.  It has also been corroborated that the chosen IVs for 
the PRP equation are insignificant determinants in the monitoring function, and vice versa.   
 
 
Table A4. First Stage Estimates of Reduced Form Equations 
 Probit PRP Ordered Probit Monitoring 
WERS 1998   
Individual or group PRP  
-0.138 
(0.073)+ 
Monitoring: Less than half 
-0.142 
(0.136) 
 
Monitoring: More than half 
-0.445 
(0.214)* 
 
IV: Employees made aware of 
responsibilities with one of individual 
or group targets 
0.422 
(0.113)** 
 
IV: Employees made aware of 
responsibilities via both individual or 
group targets 
0.487 
(0.113)** 
 
IV: Changes in work organization over 
last 5 years 
0.256 
(0.102)* 
 
IV: Organization owns or controls 
subsidiary companies outside the UK 
 
0.184 
(0.093)* 
N 2170 2170 
WERS 2004   
Merit pay  
-0.035 
(0.078) 
Monitoring: Less than half 
-0.165 
(0.135) 
 
Monitoring: More than half 
-0.034 
(0.236) 
 
IV: Ownership of firm is UK and 
foreign 
0.462 
(0.193)* 
 
IV: Individual or family owns more 
than 50% of company 
-0.258 
(0.105)* 
 
IV: Manager is proprietor/owner  
-0.401 
(0.142)** 
N (*Private sector firms) 1503 1503 
Notes: Full controls are included as in Table A3 in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of 
significance: ** 1%, * 5%, + 10 %. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
i
 For instance, estimates for the UK have placed the figure at about £6 billion per year in the 1980s (Brown and 
Sessions, 1996), rising to approximately £17 billion in 2009 (CIPD, 2009).  These figures correspond to 2-3% of 
total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), or a typical year‟s growth.  The latest calculations from the UK‟s Labour 
Force Survey also indicate that approximately 3% of contracted work hours are lost due to sickness absence, 
translating into an average annual absence of one and a half weeks for every UK employee (Ercolani, 2009). 
ii
 There is a panel element of the management questionnaire in the WERS, but unfortunately it does not contain 
information on absence rates.  Thus, we treat the 1998 and 2004 waves as two single cross sections.    
iii
 See Airey et al., 1999 and Kersley et al., 2006 for reasons why the response rates differ. 
iv
 The Employee Profile Questionnaire (EPQ) was posted to the management respondent before the interview took 
place. Mangers had to fill out the questionnaire and have it ready for the interviewer. This requirement made 
managers to look at their records and report the establishment absence rate according to their records rather than 
using their memory. Thus, we believe that measurement error due to recall bias was minimized.   
v
 The percentage of missing responses was 15.7% in 1998 and 15.4% in 2004, respectively.  After confirming that 
there is no systematic bias in the pattern of non-response using a Heckman-type selection model (Identifying 
variable: whether firms keep records on their costs), and in order to retain the full amount of available information 
in the dataset, the missing responses were not dropped from the empirical analysis.  Instead, they were recoded as 
zero values of the dependent variable, while a dummy variable identifying those cases in which there is missing 
absence information was added to the specification.   
vi
 In particular, a generalized linear model (GLM) has been estimated, which assumes that the logit transformation of 
Absence comes from the family of binomial distributions. This takes into account the excess concentration of 
observations at the boundaries of the permissible interval of responses. The results of the GLM estimation procedure 
are available from the authors upon request. 
vii
 The regression coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are found to correspond in most cases with the 
predictions of prior literature.  Due to space limitations, they are not discussed in the main text, though the reader is 
referred to Table A3 in the Appendix for further details.  
viii
 Managers had to choose between the following categories: 1. “All” (100%), 2. “Almost all” (80-99%), 3. “Most” 
(60-79%), 4. “Around half” (40-59%), 5. “Some” (20-39%), 6. “Just a few” (1-19%), 7. “None”. Given that this 
question was asked to non-managerial employees, we estimate the regressions for the non-managerial staff only.  
For this reason, the number of observations for the 1998 sample is reduced to 2,080 firms, as opposed to the 2,173 
which comprised the original sample.     
ix
 Given that this question was asked to non-managerial employees, we estimate the regressions for non-managerial 
staff only.   
x
 Such arguments have typically focused on the more complicated nature of performance measurement in state-level 
jobs (e.g. multiplicity of tasks and outputs; lack of clear goals; absence of market price signals), the prevalence of 
multiple principals with sometimes conflicting goals and the crucial role of teamwork in public good production.  
They have also highlighted the important sorting effects due to public service motivation (PSM).   
xi
 Some of these are not discussed in the text due to space considerations.  For instance, we have attempted to control 
for differences in job satisfaction among employees by exploiting the matched employer-employee element of the 
database.  In addition, we used information on the number of years of experience (in personnel or employee 
relations management) of the managers of the firms, or the title of their jobs (e.g.  human resource, employee 
relations, personnel manager) in order to correct for unobserved heterogeneity in managerial skills.   No evidence of 
change in the PRP-absence coefficient was found. 
xii
 Such changes in management refer to changes in: payment systems, working time arrangements, the organization 
of work, work techniques or to the introduction of: a new technology, a new product/service, initiatives of employee 
involvement.   
xiii
 This is similar to concerns raised about the phenomenon of „presenteeism‟ (Dew et al., 2005), whereby workers 
who are sick show up at work in order to exhibit good behaviour, though this is likely to have adverse consequences 
on productivity in the long-run. 
